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COGNITIVE ISSUES IN HEAD-UP DISPLAYS
Edith Fischer,* Richard F. Haines,t and Toni A. Price*
The abiIio, of pilots to recognize and act upon unexpected information, presented in
either the outside world or in a head-up display (HUD), was evaluated. Eight commercial
airline pilots flew 18 approaches with a flightpath-type HUD and 13 approaches with
conventional instruments #7 a fixed-base 72 7 simulator. The approaches were flown under
conditions of low visibility, turbulence, and wind shear. Vertical and lateral flight perfor-
mance was measured for five cognitive variables: an unexpected obstacle on runway;
vertical and lateral boresight-type offset of the HUD; lateral ILS beam bend-type offset;
and no anomaly. Mean response time to the runway obstacle was longer with HUD than
without it (4.12 vs 1.75 see), and two of the pilots did not see the obstacle at all with the
HUD. None of the offsets caused any deterioration in lateral flight performance, but all
caused some change in vertical tracking; all offsets seemed to magnify the environmental
effects. In all conditions, both vertical and lateral tracking was better with the HUD than
with the conventional instruments.
INTRODUCTION
To execute a successful CAT II approach and land-
ing, the pilot uses both instrument information and
visual cues from the outside scene. In the conven-
tional cockpit these two sets of information are
obtained in a sequential manner. The pilot monitors
the instrument panel in a "head-down" position, and
then at some point looks up and lands visually. With
the head-up display (HUD), instrument information
is superimposed on the outside scene, so that the
pilot can see both sets of information while looking
out at the external scene; thus the name, the
"head-up display."
Fischer (ref. 1) made an extensive literature search
on attention and cognitive switching in which the
ability of pilots to extract information from superim-
posed visual fields was explored. The cognitive issue
with the HUD was addressed by Naish (ref. 2) in a
series of laboratory, simulator, and flight tests,
by Fischer (ref. 1) in the laboratory, and again by
Naish (ref. 3) in a simulator. These studies have
shown that within the framework of the respective
experiments, pilots were capable of perceiving and
evaluating information from both sources quickly and
efficiently. However, none of these studies was con-
clusive enough to put the cognitive issue to rest. Two
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important questions remained: (1) At each point in
the approach, which information source is used for
primary control of the flightpath, and which for
monitoring? and (2) If the display draws the primary
attention of the pilot, to what extent does this
impede the transmission of possibly vital information
from the outside scene? The present study directly
addressed these questions by exposing the pilot to
various conflicts between the conformal symbology
and the outside scene, and to an unexpected obstacle
on the runway.
OBJECTIVE
The objective of the present study was to deter-
mine pilots' ability to perceive and act upon unex-
pected information presented in either the outside
world or in the HUD symbology. Perception is
defined here as detecting and identifying a stimulus
(which may be an object or a problem). "Acting
upon" requires an understanding of the perceived
stimulus.
The scope of the study was limited to the follow-
ing selected approach and landing phase issues, using
a single conformal, flightpath-type HUD (described
later) in the precision approach mode:
1. Vertical boresight offset of the HUD under
conditions of high and low visibility, with and with-
out wind shear.
2. Lateral boresight offset of the HUD under con-
ditions of high and low visibility, with and without
wind shear.
3. Wronginformationpresentedin theHUDand
in theinstrumentpaneltypical of an instrument-
landing-system (ILS) beam-bend situation, under con-
ditions of high and low visibility, with and without
wind shear.
4. Obstacle on runway under conditions of low
visibility and low ceiling.
The present cognitive study fulfilled one part of a
threefold objective. The second objective was to
quantify head-down to head-up transition behavior
with and without HUD and is presented elsewhere
(ref. 4). The third objective was to monitor eye
movement during approach and landing with and
without HUD. _
METHOD
Subjects
The eight pilots who took part in this study - five
captains and three first officers - were rated for and
currently flying the Boeing 727-type aircraft for two
major airlines. The first officers had flown an average
of 1,113 hr, and the captains an average of 2,350 hr
in their respective seats in the 727 aircraft. Each pilot
was administered vision tests to ensure that all sub-
jects had 20]20 distance acuity, normal color and
depth perception, and no visual dysfunction that
might affect performance. Seven of the pilots passed
all vision tests without glasses. The eighth pilot passed
only with glasses; he wore the glasses during the
experiment, as he does while flying.
HUD Symbology
A conformaI flightpath-type symbology was used
in the present study. The phosphor in the monitor
produced white symbols at a constant brightness
giving an approximate 10% contrast with the back-
ground.
The information was presented in a field of view
subtending 24 ° horizontally and 21 ° vertically. The
display was "conformal" in that it moved in a one-to-
one manner with the real world both in pitch and
roll, and that certain elements, such as the runway
symbol and the horizon line, were designed to overlay
their real-world counterparts. Optimal use of the
HUD information during approach and landing
required that the primary attention of the pilot be on
the flightpath symbol - that he attempt to overlay it
on the glide slope and localizer lines in a tight track-
ing task, while monitoring speed or speed error or
both. To further aid the pilot in his approach task, a
conformal runway symbol was'also provided. At a
wheel height of about 80-90 ft, the flare bars became
visible, rising from the bottom of the display to the
center. The pilot was to note them; at a wheel height
of about 30 ft he could track them in order to flare.
Although this HUD was used only.down to CAT II
minima in the present study, it was designed to give
sufficient information even to zero-zero visibility,
including rollout guidance. A detailed description of
the HUD symbology is given in reference 5 ; and the
symbology elements are described in figure 1.
Environmental Variables
Apparatus
The study was conducted in a fixed-base simulator
configured to simulate a 727-type aircraft. A full-
color, 900:1 scale (Redifon) model board background
scene, including electronic fog, was used. The HUD
symbology was optically superimposed on the visual
scene monitor and was carefully aligned daily with
the external scene. The electronic fog was also cali-
brated daily; nevertheless, there were slight variations
in the fog ceiling from day to day.
IPrice, T. A.; Haines, R. F.; and Fischer, E.: Pilot eye-
scan behavior with and without HUD. NASA Technical
Paper (in preparation).
Environment 1 (El) was used to simulate very low
visibility conditions, close to CAT II minimums. The
cloud ceiling was 120 ft, runway visual range (RVR)
was 1,600 it, light turbulence was included, and there
was no wind. A 100-ft decision height (DH) always
applied to this condition.
Environment 2 (E2) tested flight performance
under fairly strong headwind shear. Breakout altitude
was 380 ft, RVR was greater than 8,000 ft, there was
moderate turbulence, and a shear consisting of
30-knot headwind at starting altitude of 1,500 ft to
150 ft altitude, decaying to 18 knots at 50 ft, fol-
lowed by an exponential decay to 15 knots at the
runway. A 200-ft DH applied.
Environment 3 (E3) was moderately difficult to
operate in. The cloud ceiling was 615 it, RVR was
10,000 ft, there was moderate turbulence, and a shear
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Figure 1 .- Flightpath-type HUD format used.
consisting of a 25-knot headwind at starting altitude,
decreasing exponentially to zero at the runway. A
200-ft DH applied.
In Environment 7 (E7), a variation of El, the
cloud ceiling was 180 ft and the RVR 2,000 ft. A DH
of 150 ft applied. This condition was always used for
the runway obstruction conditions.
Note that none of the environments included
crosswinds, so that any effects of the lateral offsets
could be more easily interpreted. Also, as part of the
larger overall design, there were three other environ-
mental variables (E4-E6), but since data collected
under those conditions are not analyzed in this study
they are not described here (see ref. 4).
Cognitive Variables
I. Vertical boresight offset (VBO). In this condi-
tion the entire symbology set was raised 2 ° above its
correct referenced position (fig. 2). Internally the
symbology was correct and gave the proper informa-
tion, but physically the conformal symbols did not
overlay their real-world counterparts. This mismatch
condition was tested under environmental conditions
El, E2, and E3, but since this kind of offset is a
result of the HUD hardware misalignment, it was
tested only with HUD. The mismatch caused the pilot
to have the illusion or feeling of being too high.
Should the pilot follow his "feeling" and pitch down,
he would land short of the aiming point. If, however,
he followed either the symbology or the outside
scene exclusively, he would land properly.
2. Lateral boresight offset (LBO). In this condi-
tion there was a random 3 ° shift of the symbology to
either the left or right (fig. 3). Again, the symbology
was internally consistent and gave correct informa-
tion, but was out of spatial registration with the real
world. That is, if the pilot attempted to fly the flight-
path symbol onto the real runway centerline, he
would land on the edge of the runway (or possibly on
the grass). If, however, he flew the HUD only, or the
Figure2.- Verticalboresightoffset.
Figure3.- Lateralboresightoffset.
nutsidesceneonly,hewouldhavelandedproperly.
Thisoffsetconditionoccurredunderenvironmental
conditionsE1andE2only.Aswiththeverticalbore-
sightoffsetheanomalywasymbologyspecific,and
wastestedonlywiththeHUD.
Forbothtypesof boresighterrorthemagnitude
andthedirectionof theoffsetwereselectedsothat
theoffsetwouldbeclearlyperceivableatthelowest
visibilityconditiontested(El). Becausethedegreeof
the offsetwasconstant,the closerthe aircraft
approachedtherunway,thesmallerwastheperceived
discrepancy.
3. LateralILSoffset(LIO).In thisconditiona
90-ftbias,introducedinto thelocalizer(fig.4) ran-
domlyto therightor to theleft,resultedinerrone-
ousinformationin both theSperryflightdirector
(vertical)barandtheHUD.Thisconditioncanoccur
asaresultof abendin theILSbeam;therefore,it
is referredto asanILSoffset.In therealworld,of
course,suchaconditionprobablywouldbereported
by thetowerorwouldlikelyexistforonlyashort
time;moreover,typicallyit wouldbea changing
condition,notaconstantoffset.Theconditionwas
selectedasa worstcaserepresentingwronglateral
information.Withthis typeof offset(aswith the
boresightoffsets),theproblemwasnotperceivable
whilethepilotwasflyinginclouds.Onlyafterbreak-
outcouldthepilotdetecthathewasnotlinedup
withtherunway(althougheexpectedtobe).Since
this typeof errorcouldoccurwhileflyingwith
instrumentsor withHUD,it wastestedbothways
underconditionsEl, E2,andE3.It mustbenoted
thattheangularscalingof theflightdirectoris 1:6,
andtheangularscalingof theHUDis 1:1withthe
realworld.Consequently,asmalldiscrepancywould
notlikelybeveryobviousontheflightdirector,but
wouldbeontheHUD.In addition,oncethepilot
comeshead-up,he is likelyto makelateralcorrec-
tionsbasedonhisexternalvisualinformationonly;
Figure4.- LateralILSoffset.
thus,hemightnotbecomeawareofthelocalizeroff-
setfromhisflightdirector.WiththeItUD,however,
if thepilot flewonlytheflightpathsymbol(which
didnotdependonlocalizerinput)ontotherealrun-
way,hecouldlandtheaircraftproperly.Ofcourse,
whileflyingwithHUDthepilotcouldalsoignoreall
symbologyandjustlandvisually.
4. Obstructionon runway(OB).A scalemodel
of a currentwide-bodyaircraftwasplacedhalfway
ontotherunwayat a45° angle,asif it wasturning
fromanadjoiningtaxiwayneartherunwaythreshold
(fig.5). Eachpilotencounteredthisconditiononce
withtheHUDandoncewithoutit duringthe31data
runs- four pilots being first exposed to the incursion
while using HUD, the other four being first exposed
when not using HUD. Since the presentation order of
all test run conditions was randomized, the first
obstacle runs were encountered anywhere between
data run 5 and data run 22; there were from 5 to
21 runs between the first and the second exposures.
The objective was to test the pilot's ability to criti-
cally perceive the outside world under conditions of
low visibility while using HUD; as mentioned, only
E7 was used. This visibility condition was selected to
give the pilot sufficient time, following the initial
appearance of the obstacle, so that he could execute a
missed approach. The runway obstruction became
visible as something dark on the runway, but not
necessarily identifiable, about 4-5 sec after breakout,
depending on the aircraft's position at the time. The
pilot then had about 7-8 sec to execute a missed
approach, depending on the position and speed of the
aircraft.
5. No offset (NO). Each pilot had one run each in
conditions El, E2, and E3, with and without HUD, in
which the symbology was correctly aligned with the
runway. These runs provided baseline performance
data and made it possible to compare flight perfor-
mance with and without the "cognitive anomalies."
Figure 5.- Runway obstruction.
Experimental Design and Performance Measures
The 31 data runs that each pilot flew included 18
with HUD and 13 without HUD, 7 environmental
variables, and 5 cognitive variables. In this report only
19 of the 31 runs that pertain to the cognitive vari-
ables (under El, E2, E3, and E7) are analyzed and
discussed; 11 of these runs had one of the offset con-
ditions, 2 had runway obstructions, and 6 were con-
trol runs with no offset. A summary of the experi-
mental variables is presented in table 1. All pilots
encountered each combination once; therefore, every
cell includes 8 data points.
All runs were videotaped. The resulting video
image included the outside scene and the superim-
posed HUD, just as the pilot saw it. A moving white
dot was visible whenever eye-movement data were
recorded (see footnote 1). In addition, a picture of
the pilot's face was inset in the screen to permit
quantification of head-up transition behavior (see
ref. 4). All communications between pilot and experi-
menters were recorded. These tapes provided useful
backup information and helped in interpreting the
data.
Flight performance measures included localizer
and glide-slope deviations expressed in feet, which
were sampled at every 100-ft altitude down to 200 ft,
then at 150, 100, 75, 50, and 25 ft, and at landing.
Root mean square (rms) values in degrees (indicating
the mean deviation from the desired values, regardless
of the direction of the deviation) for the above vari-
ables were also recorded for various segments of the
flight.
A flight performance measure obtained in all con-
ditions was whether the pilot landed or executed a
missed approach. Pilot comments were recorded dur-
ing and between runs, from the voice tape and from
the post-test debriefing questionnaires.
Procedure
Each pilot underwent training, data collection, and
debriefing, as described below. The entire procedure
took about 8-10 hr, including breaks whenever neces-
sary. Pilots were initially scheduled for 4-hr sessions
on two consecutive days, and were brought back for
additional sessions as necessary.
Training- The pilots received a detailed descrip-
tion of the display symbology - and familiarized
themselves with it - before they reported for testing.
At the first session a battery of eye tests was admin-
istered. The actual training started with showing the
pilot a 20-min narrated videotape explaining and
demonstrating the various features of the HUD in
flight. A question and answer period (and occasion-
ally a second viewing of the tape) followed, until
both the pilot and the experimenter were satisfied
that the pilot conceptually understood the symbol-
ogy. At that point training in the simulator began.
Each pilot flew a minimum of five increasingly dif-
ficult approaches without HUD to become familiar
with the simulator environment and the aircraft's
flying qualities. When the pilot was satisfied with his
level of proficiency, training with the HUD began.
Each pilot flew at least eight training approaches with
the HUD. These runs started out with simple maneu-
vers in clear visibility and calm winds and gradually
included turbulence, crosswind, wind shear, and low
visibility, as well as the checklist, callout, and missed
approach cockpit procedures. Each pilot was asked to
indicate his preference for callouts, and these calls
were then used in the data collection phase. If the
TABLE 1.-SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS
Cognitive variables a
Environmenta HUD No HUD
OB VBO LBO LIO NO OB VBO LBO LIO NO
El
E2
E3
E7
aDefined in text.
# *
pilot wanted more training runs he got them. On the
second and succeeding days refresher training was
provided by beginning the sessions with at least one
no-HUD and two HUD runs. During all training runs
there was a constant interaction and feedback
between the pilot and the experimenter. When both
the pilot and the experimenter were satisfied about
the pilot's competence in handling the simulator and
the HUD, data collection began. The flying part of
the training averaged about 3 hr, about 2 hr of which
were devoted to flying with the HUD.
Note that the training did not include exposure to
any of the offset or obstacle conditions, nor was the
possibility of the occurrence of such anomalies men-
tioned. The pilots were told only that the purpose of
the study was to test the HUD under various environ-
mental conditions.
Data runs- Once data collection began, one of the
experimenters (R.F.H.) assumed the role of the first
officer. Another experimenter (E.F.) stood behind
the pilot to observe and control the procedures. Each
trial started on autopilot (to ensure uniform initial
conditions for all runs and all pilots) in level flight at
an altitude of 1,500 ft and 8 miles from the runway;
a run lasted about 4 rain. For more realism a taped,
air traffic control communication was played to the
pilot's headset, down to about 400 ft. The procedure
required the first officer to call for the weather report
and landing clearance soon after the run started.
After the tower's report the pilot was asked to
disconnect the autopilot, unless it was a coupled
approach. The pilot and copilot went through the
appropriate checklist, that is, for HUD or for head-
down flight, and usually completed it by the glide-
slope capture. During the descent the first officer
gave the desired callouts and in every way complied
with the pilot's commands. The callout always
included "ground in sight," "runway in sight," or
some equivalent indication of visual contact with the
ground. At this point the first officer pushed a
button, thus recording the first perception of the
outside world. The pilot was instructed to say "deci-
sion" when he had enough external visual cues to
decide whether to land or to go around. This was also
recorded by a button push. If there was an offset or
an obstacle oil the runway, the first officer did not
call the pilot's attention to it; this was done in order
to see the pilot's unbiased reaction. (However, at the
beginning of the study the first officer did call atten-
tion to the obstacle twice by mistake, as will be dis-
cussed later.)
After rollout or, in the case of a missed approach,
after stabilization of the flight, the run was termi-
nated by tile experimenter. To protect the external
scene equipment, any run was terminated by the
experimenter (E.F.) if there was an imminent danger
of crashing (decided subjectively by the experi-
menter).
Debriefing- After all data runs were completed,
the pilot was questioned about the various aspects of
the study (see ref. 4). In addition to answering these
specific questions he was encouraged to offer other
information, observations, suggestions, etc., pertain-
ing to the study.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Results will be presented and discussed separately
for each of the cognitive variables. The mean glide-
slope and localizer deviation for the last 800 ft of
descent and other pertinent information for each con-
dition is presented in the appendix.
Vertical Boresight Offset
The vertical boresight offset required no corrective
action by the pilot - only the position of the symbol-
ogy was off, not the aircraft. It is reasonable to
assume that a significant vertical deviation from the
glide slope contributes to the illusion created by the
mismatch.
Analysis of variance To assess overall vertical
flightpath performance, two separate analyses of vari-
ance were performed comparing the offset with the
no-offset condition while flying with HUD. One used
rms glide-slope deviation, the other rms control-
column displacement as the relevant response mea-
sure. Each analysis was a 2-condition (offsett, no off-
set) X 3-environment (El, E2, E3) X 2-segrnent
(800-300 ft, 300-50 ft) X 8-pilot design. The analysis
showed no statistically significant difference between
offset and no-offset conditions for either measure-
ment. However, since rms values show only
magnitude, deviations above the glide slope in one
environment and below the glide slope in another
environment would cancel each other. There was a
significant difference for both measurements between
environments (p < 0.005). This was expected,
because E2 and E3 contained wind shear that would
influence glide-slope tracking; E1 had no wind shear.
The difference for the glide-slope deviation between
segments(p< 0.001)wasalsoexpected,becausethe
last segment (300-50 ft) included a portion of the
flare maneuver, while the 800-300-ft segment fol-
lowed the flightpath. The interaction between envi-
ronment and segment for the glide-slope deviation
was also significant (p < 0.005), E3 producing almost
twice as much increase in mean deviation from the
800-300-ft segment to the 300-50-ft segment as did
El; the deviation increase for E2 was between those
for E3 and El. This indicates that the longer the pilot
assessed the offset, the more he deviated from the
glide slope, suggesting that the longer the exposure to
the offset, the stronger the illusion effect.
Glide-slope deviation- To take a closer look at
flightpath performance after breakout (when the
discrepancy is evident), raw glide-slope deviation in
feet was plotted at altitude intervals from 800-25 ft
for each environment, with and without offset
(fig. 6); the deviation is described below.
In El the low breakout brought the aircraft so
close to the runway that the offset was not very
obvious; in fact, none of the pilots gave any indica-
tion of even being aware of the offset. However, the
top graph in figure 6 shows that with the offset,
pilots got above glide slope at an altitude of about
100 ft (breakout was at 120 It). Landing data indi-
cate that the pilots also overshot the 1,000-ft mark.
Comparing the no-offset and offset conditions, the
mean glide-slope deviation for 150-25-ft altitude was
-4.6 ft versus +3.0 ft, and the mean touchdown dis-
tance from the runway threshold was 855 ft versus
1263 ft, respectively. Thus, in the offset condition
the pilots flew about 8 ft higher and landed about
400 ft farther down the runway than they did with-
out offset.
In the E2 condition the wind shear acted to place
the aircraft below glide slope from an altitude of
about 150 ft down, which usually resulted in landing
short of the 1,000-ft mark. This effect was most pro-
nounced in the no-HUD, no-offset control condition,
where the mean glide-slope deviation between
150-25 ft was -12.4 ft and the mean touchdown dis-
tance was 106 ft past the runway threshold. Two of
the pilots actually touched down short of the run-
way. With the HUD in the no-offset condition the
effect was less. The mean glide-slope deviation for the
same segment was -9.6 ft, still below glide slope, but
the touchdown distance was 1,107 ft, indicating that
the HUD enabled the pilots to compensate for the
shear condition. For the vertical offset of the HUD
(center graph in fig. 6), the mean glide-slope deviation
for the 150-25-ft altitude segment was -19.6 ft, and
the landing distance was 529 ft, about 10 ft lower
and 600 ft shorter, respectively, than without the
offset. It seems that the offset initially distracted the
pilots from dealing with the shear, causing the aircraft
to descend well below the glide slope; but some of
this was compensated for before touchdown, as the
landing distance indicates.
In E3, pilots tended to go above glide slope at an
altitude of about 150 ft, but came back to, or even
below, glide slope by touchdown (lower graph in
fig. 6). Again, this effect was increased in the offset
condition, as shown by both the mean glide-slope
deviation (3.0 vs 11.4 ft), and touchdown distance
(737 vs 1,025 ft) for the 150-25-ft segment.
No missed approaches were made in any of the
vertical offset conditions.
The graphs indicate that the offset did influence
vertical tracking performance to some degree; how-
ever, the pilots did not seem to be consciously aware
of anything being wrong. None of the pilots made
any comments about the symbology being in the
wrong location, and only a couple of comments were
made to the effect that "It seems farther out" than
the information in the symbology (i.e., altitude,
ground distance) suggests.
To sum up the results of the vertical boresight
runs, none of the changes in performances noted
above are significant from a practical point of view.
In all cases the pilots landed as well or better with the
HUD (even when there was an offset condition), than
they did without HUD. It must be noted, however,
that the vertical boresight offset did reduce the effec-
tiveness of the HUD in aiding the pilot to cope with
the environment, resulting in larger deviations from
the glide slope and that the pilots were not aware of
the additional problem (i.e., the offset). Should such
an offset occur in combination with an extreme
shear, it could become a potentially dangerous
situation.
It should be remembered that in the present study
pilots were not only unaware of what a mismatch
looks like, but were not even informed of potential
mismatch problems. The above results point out the
necessity to train the pilots to readily recognize
abnormalities that may occur while using the HUD.
Lateral Boresight Offset
Analysis of variance- As in the previous condi-
tion, two separate analyses of variance were con-
ducted to compare the overall performance in offset
and no-offset conditions while flying the HUD. The
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design was the same as previously described, except
there were only two environmental conditions, E1
and E2, and the performance measures were rms
localizer deviation and rms control wheel displace-
ment. The analysis of variance for the rms localizer
deviation indicated no significant difference between
the offset and no-offset condition. The rms wheel
displacement was significantly different at the
p < 0.05 level of confidence. Interestingly, more
wheel movement was made in the no-offset than in
the offset condition in the last segment (14.6 ° vs
12.8°), where the offset became evident. Obviously,
the nonconformity of the symbology did not act to
increase workload, at least as measured by wheel dis-
placement. On the contrary, the offset seemed to
draw the pilots' attention to lateral performance,
resulting in smoother handling of the control wheel.
Localizer deviation- The raw localizer deviation
data showed no meaningful difference or trend in the
offset condition for either environment tested. For
example, in E1 for the 150-25-ft altitude segment,
the mean localizer deviation was 3.3 ft with offset
and 2 ft without offset; in E2 it was 7.9 and 6 ft,
respectively. In all cases the pilots tracked the center-
line very closely.
To see if the lateral offset influenced vertical flight
performance, glide-slope deviation was compared in
the offset and no-offset conditions. It was found that
in E1 for the 150-25-ft segment the mean glide-slope
deviation was +4,2 ft with offset and -4.6 ft without
offset; in E2 it was -7.2 ft versus -9.6 ft, respectively.
Landing distances were 1,270 ft versus 855 ft in El,
and 690 ft versus 1,107 ft in E2 for the offset and
no-offset conditions. It may be seen that in El, pilots
flew about 12 ft higher and landed about 400 ft
farther with the offset; in E2, while their glide-slope
tracking did not deteriorate, compared to the
no-offset condition, they landed about 400 ft shorter
with the offset.
The interesting phenomenon with the lateral bore-
sight offset was the pilots' misinterpretation of it. In
contrast with the vertical boresight offset runs, on
these runs all pilots recognized that something was
wrong with the symbology and made comments to
that effect. However, most of them attributed the
lateral offset position of the symbology as being the
result of crosswind, and continued to use the infor-
mation it provided. Some pilots even praised the way
the symbology guided them in crosswind. (As men-
tioned earlier, none of the data runs contained cross-
wind.) This mistake is somewhat understandable, as
the offset was a constant 3 °, so the closer the pilot
got to the runway the smaller the apparent discrep-
ancy, thus suggesting that a correction was being
made; moreover, the information in the HUD and in
the outside world told him he was on centerline. In
this condition the pilots made the right response for
the wrong reason. It must be remembered, however,
that during the training it was explained to all pilots
that crosswind is indicated by a lateral separation
between the aircraft and the flightpath symbols only.
Each pilot had at least two runs with crosswind, so
they could experience how the symbols behaved.
There were no missed approaches in the lateral
boresight offset in either environmental condition
tested.
In summary, the lateral boresight offset did not
affect the pilots' lateral flight performance nor does
this kind of offset seem to pose any serious potential
problems; however, the results indicate that the offset
did change vertical tracking and landing performance
to some degree, and the pilots did not recognize the
true nature of the problem. This again suggests the
necessity of more thorough training, not only in fly-
ing the HUD, but in the potential problems that can
arise.
Lateral ILS Offset
The lateral ILS offset, which placed the aircraft
either to the left or to the right of the real runway at
breakout, required recognition and corrective action
by the pilot. Comparing pilot response time and the
accuracy of his correction with and without HUD
indicates whether the HUD had any effect on flight
performance.
Response time- Pilot response time was measured
for each environment for both HUD-offset and no-
HUD-offset runs from breakout to the time the air-
craft started (and continued on)a converging path
to the real runway. It was found that response time
to the offset was faster without HUD in all three envi-
ronments tested: in E 1 by 0.14 sec, in E2 by 0.51 sec,
and in E3 by 2.12 secl Thus, on the average, pilots
responded to the offset 0.92 sec faster without HUD
than with HUD. (For total response times see the
appendix, tables 4-6.)
Analysis of variance- Two analyses of variance
were performed, one using rms localizer error, the
other rms control-wheel displacement as response
measures. The design was similar to the one used in
the boresight offset conditions, except that a
"no-HUD, offset" and a "no-HUD, no-offset" condi-
tion was added.
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Theoffsetcausednosignificantdifferencein rms
localizerdeviation,andcausedonlyamoderatedif-
ferencein rmswheeldisplacement,therebeing0.67 °
more displacement with offset, thus reflecting that a
correction was being made. The difference due to seg-
ment (800-300 and 300-50 ft) was significant at the
p < 0.005 level, there being 2.45 ° more wheel move-
ment in the last segment, indicating that most of the
correction was made during the 300-50-ft altitude
segment. The interaction of offset and segment, sig-
nificant at the p < 0.05 confidence level, also reflects
this.
Whether the pilots were flying with or without
HUD made a significant difference both in rms wheel
displacement (p _ 0.05) and in rms localizer devia-
tion (p < 0.005). With the HUD the rms wheel dis-
placement was 3.43 ° more for the 800-25-ft segment
than it was for the no-HUD runs, but the localizer
deviation was 3 times smaller (0.07 ° vs 0.21 °) than
without HUD.
The analysis of variance results show that the off-
set had no significant effect on lateral convergence;
pilots flew more accurately with the HUD; they also
worked harder for this increased accuracy, as the
larger wheel displacement and their comments
indicated.
Localizer deviation- To look closer at the lateral
performance with the ILS offset, the absolute local-
izer deviation (i.e., irrespective of the direction of the
error) is plotted for the last 800 ft of altitude (fig. 7).
The figure shows mean localizer error and plus and
minus one Standard deviation with and without HUD
under the offset condition for each environment
tested. The figure also indicates the real runway cen-
terline and the 90-ft offset line. The latter was the
indicated runway centerline on both the HUD and
the flight director localizer bar. While in the clouds,
the pilots should have followed the indicated local-
izer, which in the real world would have placed them
on a path parallel to the runway and 90 ft to one side
of it. After the breakout the pilots were able to per-
ceive the discrepancy, and should have converged to
the real runway centerline; as can be seen, that is
what happened.
The data in figure 7 reflect the main effects of the
analysis of variance. With the HUD, localizer tracking
was more accurate than it was with the instrument
panel in all environments, including strong wind
shear. This is indicated by the mean flightpath flown
and by the magnitude of the standard deviation,
which was considerably larger for the no-HUD condi-
tions. The standard deviation includes both within
trial differences (i.e., the pilot oscillates about the
target line) and between subject differences (i.e.,
individual pilots were deviating in varying magnitude
and direction from the target line).
An interesting phenomenon is the "ballooning
out" of the standard deviation with the HUD after
breakout. It is not evident in El, probably because at
breakout the pilots were so close to the runway - the
runway was such a strong stimulus that seven of the
eight pilots reported abandoning the ttUD for (exter-
nal) visual information and making the substantial
lateral correction necessary to land. One of the pilots
continued to rely on the HUD guidance information
and soon realized that it would not guide him back,
so he executed a missed approach. The "ballooning
out" may be observed in both E2 and E3, where the
visibility conditions allowed the pilot sufficient time
to observe and evaluate the discrepancy. The offset
seemed to create an uncertainty in the pilots. All of
the pilots tracked the HUD tightly in the clouds, but
after being confronted by the mismatch they took
different actions, tn E2, four of the pilots continued
to follow the HUD for a while longer, even though
they made verbal comments about the symbology
being off. Two of these resulted in missed approaches.
The other four pilots abandoned the HUD guidance
soon after they became aware of the discrepancy,
reported that they were going "visual," and started
converging. The same four pilots who in E2 chose to
follow HUD longer, also elected to stay with it longer
in E3. Two other pilots started to converge imme-
diately, and two tried to figure out what was wrong
with the HUD and oscillated back and forth between
the wrong HUD information and the real runway, as
indicated by their comments and by the localizer
deviation on the strip-chart records. There were no
missed approaches in E3 in the ILS offset condition.
There was no strong trend in vertical tracking in
E1 and E2; however, in E3 pilots exhibited the same
tendency of going above glide slope more with the
offset than without it (14 ft vs 3 ft) as they did in
the boresight offsets.
Altogether there were six missed approaches
(12.5% of the total) with the ILS offset, three of
them with the HUD and three with instruments. In
comparison, in the no-offset control condition there
were four missed approaches (8.3%), one with and
three without HUD.
In summary, the lateral ILS offset did not affect
lateral performance with the HUD any differently
than it did without HUD; however, pilots did respond
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to the offset a little sooner without the HUD. Local-
izer tracking was generally more accurate with the
HUD, but when confronted with the ILS offset, it
deteriorated to the level of visual tracking, suggesting
that the pilots critically evaluated the display, found
it useless, and switched to visual guidance.
Regarding all the offset conditions in general,
pilots said that the offset was a nuisance, although it
did not interfere with their performance. They also
indicated that they would prefer to fly with the HUD
even if it was offset, because "the HUD provided
some reference to go by."
Obstacle on Runway
Because of the small sample size and the somewhat
irregular application of this test variable, no statistical
analysis was attempted.
As noted earlier, four of the pilots first encoun-
tered the runway obstacle (airplane) with HUD and
four first encountered it without HUD. The first pilot
who was tested experienced his initial encounter of
the obstacle without HUD; however, the environment
was the higher visibility E2, instead of E7. In addi-
tion, the first officer called attention to it as soon as
he saw it, at about 350 ft altitude, saying "There is
something on the runway." The pilot responded with
"Let's go down and take a look at it," which he did
and then executed a missed approach at an altitude of
190 ft. The first officer inadvertently called attention
to the obstacle one more time with pilot No. 4, als0
in a first-encounter, no-HUD condition. Because of
these irregularities, data for these two runs are not
reported" however, they are considered as the first
exposures to the obstacle for these two pilots. All
other runs were made in E7, and with no advance
warning.
In the actual simulation it was about 4-5 sec after
breakout before the "airplane" became detectable as
an obstacle. During the tTrst 1-2 sec of visibility (after
descent below clouds in which visibility was zero) the
retinal size of the airplane image was still relatively
small, allowing the HUD symbology to partially
obscure it. Nevertheless, with the HUD the pilot was
head-up at the first opportunity to perceive the
obstacle. In contrast to this, when flying with head-
down instruments, most of the pilots glanced up
quickly when the first officer called out "ground in
sight" and went back to the instruments again. Some
pilots took one or two more quick glances up but all
would come head-up permanently only after the first
officer indicated the runway was in sight. By this
time the airplane was always clearly visible. The inter-
ested reader is referred to a companion paper for
more details (ref. 4).
Table 2 is a summary of the pilot's response time
to the airplane on the runway. For the HUD flights it
represents the time from the first opportunity to see
the airplane to the first response of the pilot, which
most often was a verbal exclamation. For the
no-HUD runs, response time represents the time from
the final look-up to the response, for this was the
available time for perceiving the obstacle. The table
also includes the particular response made, which was
either an executed missed approach (MA) or an
intended missed approach (IMA). The IMA resulted
when the pilot saw the airplane and called for the
MA, but the experimenter terminated the run (some-
times simultaneously with the pilot's call) before the
MA was actually carried out, in order to prevent
damage to camera equipment.
As may be seen in table 2, two pilots did not see
the airplane at all. Both of these runs were with HUD
and were the pilots' first exposures to the obstruc-
tion. Pilot D was a first officer with approximately
2,000 hr in the 727; his performance with both the
head-down instruments and the HUD was considered
good; he flew 21 data runs prior to the first obstacle
encounter. The airplane became increasingly visible
about 4 sec after breakout, but the pilot gave no indi-
cation of seeing it. He was pleased with his approach
"setup," as indicated by his comments: "... oh, it
looks good (1 I0 ft) . . . the HUD looks good (90 ft)
.... " The experimenter terminated the run at an
altitude of about 67 ft. "...Oh, wait a minute! It
looked good, the flare bars were coming up ... then
the picture disappeared." The subsequent exchange
between first officer and pilot: "1 saw an airplane.
Did you see it? .... No." "You didn't see it? .... No,
sir."
Pilot F was a high-flight-time captain who demon-
strated exceptionally good performance, both with
and without HUD. The runway obstruction run was
his seventh data run. He indicated his "Decision
(140 ft) . . . to land (110 ft)," and proceeded to do
so. The experimenter terminated the run at an alti-
tude of 50 ft - the pilot was surprised. Pilot: "Didn't
get to flare on this one." First officer: "No you
didn't . . . I was just looking up as it (the picture)
disappeared and I thought I saw something on the
runway. Did you see anything?" Pilot: "No, I did
not." The experimenters suggested that an equipment
failure was probably to blame.
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TABLE2.-RESPONSETIMEANDTYPE OF
RESPONSE TO AIRPLANE ON THE RUNWAY
Pilot
A
B
C
G
Mean
First exposure Second Exposure
Response Type of Response Type of
time,sec response a time, sec response a
No HUD HUD
--- MA, E2, warned
1 MA
--- MA, warned
3 IMA
2.0
2 MA
3 MA
3 MA
3 IMA
2.75
HUD No HUD
D 6b Never saw
E 5 IMA
F 6b Never saw
H 5 IMA
Mean 5.5 b
2 MA
2 MA
1 MA
1 IMA
1.5
aMA = missed approach; IMA = intended missed
approach.
bThese values are not response times, since the pilot never
saw the airplane - rather, they denote the available time in
which the airplane could have been seen; the mean also
includes these values.
Both of these pilots saw the airplane on the second
exposure without the HUD (13 runs and 21 runs
later, respectively) and executed missed approaches.
Upon seeing the tapes during their individual debrief-
ing session, both expressed surprise and concern that
they missed such an obvious stimulus. Pilot D said
that "If I didn't see it (the tape), I wouldn't believe
it. I honestly didn't see anything on that runway." It
may be argued that if these pilots had been allowed
to continue the run to a lower altitude (as some of
the other pilots had been, see table 3), they would
have seen the obstacle in time.
On the remainder of the trials all of the pilots did
see and react to the obstacle. Table 2 shows that
mean response time was longer with the HUD than
without it (4.13 sec vs 1.75 sec) and was longer on
the first exposure than on the second one (3.75 sec
vs 2.13 sec). It seemed reasonable to expect some
order effect. Most pilots were impressed by their first
encounter with the runway obstacle, and, although
they did not know if there was going to be more of
the same, they were on the alert and were more cau-
tious about calling out "decision."
Table 3 shows the aircraft's position in terms of
radio altitude in feet (ALT) representing wheel
height, and ground distance from the runway thresh-
old (DIS) in feet. These data are shown at the time
the first reaction (RT) to the obstacle was made, and
at the lowest altitude (LOW) achieved (this occurred
either where the airplane "bottomed out" on a
go-around, or where the experimenter terminated the
run).
If we look at the aircraft's position at the point
where the first reaction (RT) to the obstacle was
made, we find that it was closest to the runway
threshold both in altitude and ground distance when
the encounter was a first exposure with HUD. The
rest of the time there was not much difference,
although the order effect found for response time is
suggested in the position data as well.
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TABLE3.-AIRCRAFTPOSITIONSDURING
OBSTACLERUNS
Pilot
A
B
C
G
Mean
Firstexposurea Second exposure a
RT LOW RT LOW
ALT DIS ALT DIS ALT DIS ALT DIS
No HUD HUD
72 960 45 480
63 505 50 250 b
68 733 48 365
105 1295 57 375
71 550 60 330
51 550 40 320
61 550 50 330 b
72 736 52 339
HUD No HUD
D Never saw 67 450
E 61 360 61 360 b
F Never saw 50 240
H 63 470 63 470/9
Mean 62 415 60 380
95 590 82 345
131 1280 107 830
70 545 56 300
61 495 50 270 b
89 728 74 436
aRT = time of first reaction to obstacle; LOW = lowest
altitude achieved; ALT = radio altitude in feet; DIS = ground
distance from runway threshold in feet.
bThese are intended missed approaches where the pilot
called for go-around, but had no chance to actually initiate or
fully execute the missed approach.
Tables 2 and 3 show that although pilots had a
shorter response time without HUD (when they did
respond), it was counteracted by the fact that they
did come head-up later and thus saw the aircraft from
about the same distance as with HUD and came to
within the same distance of it.
In addition to the data runs reported here, two of
the pilots received extra obstacle runs at tile end of
data collection. The results of these runs suggest that
further exposure may not result in improved perfor-
mance, possibly as a result of fatigue.
Interpretation of the obstacle data- The findings
that response time was longer, and especially that two
of the eight pilots did not see the obstacle at all with
the HUD, indicated that the HUD may restrict or
even inhibit the pilot in perceiving information from
the outside world when flying a simulator. The ques-
tion is, to what extent can these results be general-
ized to the real world? Several factors should be con-
sidered as they relate to generalizing these results to
the real world. They are discussed in three groups:
(1) those likely to occur in the real world with any
HUD; (2) those that are likely a result of the proper-
ties of the specific type of HUD symbology used in
this study; and (3) those that are likely to be an
artifact of the present simulation.
First, let us consider five factors that are likely to
occur in the real world with any HUD.
Factor 1 - obstacles on runways continue to be a
safety problem. The NASA Aviation Safety Report-
ing System (ref. 6) cites 135 potentially hazardous
runway incursions between July 1, 1976 and June 30,
1978. The report concludes that "Incursions of air-
craft onto runways at controlled airports represent a
significant safety problem."
Factor 2 - the last phase of the approach and
landing is very stressful even with the HUD; that is,
the pilot extends maximum effort. Several pilots in
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thepresentstudynotedthatalthought eythought
thattheywerecontrollingthe aircraft better with
HUD, their workload was just as high or higher than
in the conventional approach, for there was more
information to process. Because of the high stress the
pilot is necessarily constraining his visual attention to
the immediate task at hand, and may not be aware of
information that is below the point of maximum
attention. Without HUD, maximum attention is
tightly held to the target point on the runway on late
final. The 2- and 3-sec lag in responding to the
obstacle in the no-HUD cases in the present study
probably reflects this concentration. This single-
mindedness is illustrated by the comment of one
pilot (ref. 6) after a real runway obstacle encounter:
"When 1 received clearance into position, I looked to
my left. It may be difficult to believe that I looked
and did not see an aircraft coming toward me .... I
should have seen the other aircraft, and I bear the
responsibility for not having seen it .... " This pilot
was flying without HUD. However, the lack of
response to (in fact the total blocking out of) the
airplane on the runway by the two pilots in the pres-
ent study was similar to this episode, although they
were flying with HUD.
Factor 3 - it may be assumed that when it is avail-
able, pilots prefer to use the HUD for the primary
control of the flightpath, and to use the outside scene
for monitoring purposes only, for the HUD provides
more accurate guidance in the last phase of the
approach than is obtainable from visual cues. In the
present study, pilots indicated a strong preference for
flying with the HUD.
Factor 4 - the symbology is more compelling than
the outside scene, because there is much more imme-
diately perceivable change going on, calling for more
attention.
Factor 5 -- in addition, in the last phase of the
flight the pilot is probably more fatigued, yet the
workload is relatively high. Paying attention to two
sets of information continuously and vigilantly in
such a condition is demanding and stressful. The pilot
may unwittingly lapse into paying attention to only
one information source. Because the HUD informa-
tion is more accurate and more compelling, it is likely
to be the one followed. In the current study, several
pilots admitted that from time to t_me they caught
themselves totally fixating on the symbology, obliv-
ious of anything else, and had to consciously force
their attention to the outside scene.
Secondly, let us consider four factors that are
likely due to the specific symbology used in this
study.
Factor 1 - the HUD was designed to provide suf-
ficient information even in zero-zero visibility condi-
tions, that is, HUD guidance could be followed with-
out direct use of the visual runway, although ideally
it (also) should have been monitored. This redun-
dancy of information may have created a conflict in
the pilot, as he could use or ignore the outside cues at
will. Not only could he ignore the outside world, but
from about 150 ft and down (from about the time
the obstacle became visible) the necessary tight con-
trol of the flightpath symbol in relation to the glide-
slope symbol (and not the real runway) demanded
maximum attention by the pilot. If the approach task
had included aiming symbology at the "real" runway,
thus forcing the pilot's attention to the outside
world, the results might have been different.
Factor 2 - as may be seen in Fig. 5 the central
symbols obscured the obstacle to a large degree at the
time the obstacle first became visible, and by a
decreasing amount all the way down. The airplane
became clearly recognizable only about 2 sec after it
became visible. It is interesting to note that the six
pilots who did see the obstacle through the HUD
believed that they detected it sooner with the HUD
than without it. The typical explanation was that
"The airplane was easier to see with the HUD because
I was head-up."
Factor 3 - there were comments by some pilots
that too many symbols were cluttering the center of
the HUD's field of view. They recommended declut-
tering on final approach. In addition, the central sym-
bols were too close together, inhibiting normal eye
scanning.
Factor 4 - based on pilot comments, the flare bars
were too compelling. Once they became visible, all
pilots reported concentrating most of their visual or
cognitive attention, or both, on them. It is interesting
to note, however, that in all but one of the cases in
which the obstacle was seen through the HUD,
response occurred at about the time the eye scan had
to be modified to take in the flare symbol (3 ° to 5 °
below the flightpat h symbol, approximately overlay-
ing the obstacle).
Thirdly, let us consider the possible influence of
five factors related to the present simulation on the
results.
Factor 1 - although all pilots agreed that the
visual scene simulation was good, especially compared
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with thetrainingsimulatorstheywereusedto, the
resolution was poorer, images were more "fuzzy,"
and the three-dimensional depth effect was not as
good as in the real world. The relative deficiency of
the outside visual cues may have been the cause of
the apparently exaggerated attention on tracking the
symbology in the present study. Still, it should be
noted that none of the pilots, including the two who
did not see the obstacle, believed that the quality of
the visual simulation would inhibit them from seeing
the airplane on the runway.
Factor 2 - as far as realism is concerned, in spite
of all efforts to achieve the contrary, it was hard for
the pilots to forget that they were flying a new
approach every few minutes in a fixed-base simulator.
Also, they tended to focus their attention on tracking
the ttUD closely, because it was new to them, rather
than "landing the aircraft safely," as they would in
the real world.
Factor 3 - in addition, all pilots have a set of
expectancies when flying a simulator, none of which
includes an obstacle on the runway. Human beings
tend not to notice things they do not expect, espe-
cially in high stress situations. These pilots were not
informed of the possible occurrence of such a stimu-
lus. This is unrealistic, because in the real world they
are far more aware of such a possibility. The generally
shorter response time to the second encounter indi-
cates that awareness of this possibility improves
performance.
Factor 4 - the cockpit procedures used here were
irregular in that the first officer did not report the
obstacle, as he likely would have, if he followed the
regular procedures these pilots were used to. The two
times he did report it, the pilots had no difficulty
executing a timely missed approach.
Factor 5 - it may also be argued that the results
are reflecting insufficient training. Although the
pilots did learn to correctly control the simulator so
as to track the symbols after 8-10 trials, it is not the
same as really understanding and "instantly knowing"
how to use them in any situation. The pilots reported
that they began to feel relaxed and confident in fly-
ing the HUD only toward the end of the experiment,
after 25-30 runs with the HUD. This suggests that
throughout the study the pilots were probably focus-
ing mainly on how to fly the HUD, not how to fly
the airplane.
In summary, due to the small sample size and the
possible compounding effect of numerous factors, the
present study cannot provide a clear-cut answer to
whether the HUD will restrict or otherwise inhibit
pilots from perceiving critical changes in the outside
world. There are several factors that are likely to
occur in the real world, as they did in the simulation:
pilots will encounter obstacles on runways; their
workload with the tIUD will likely be just as high (or
higher) as without HUD; the HUD is likely to demand
their primary attention; and, if the HUD is totally
self-sufficient and consistent, they may neglect to
monitor the outside scene. These effects were prob-
ably magnified by the simulation effects; neverthe-
less, they should be taken into serious consideration
by HUD users, until further studies clarify the issues.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The objective of the study was to assess pilots'
ability to perceive and act upon unexpected informa-
tion presented in either the outside world or in the
HUD symbology.
In view of the objectives the results of the study
are as follows:
1. None of the pilots reported perceiving the verti-
cal boresight offset, and they did not act as if they
understood it. Landing performance suggests that
these pilots responded to some degree to the illusion
the offset created. Nevertheless, pilots landed well
within the acceptable region on the runway.
2. All pilots perceived the lateral offset. Although
they did not understand the specific nature of it,
their actions indicated that they understood the
essence of the problem and responded appropriately.
That is, in the case of the lateral boresight offset, the
information was correct and usable; in the case of the
ILS lateral offset, part of the information was wrong,
and the rest of the symbology was usable. Pilots were
not aware that offset influenced their flight perfor-
mance in any way. The results show that offsets,
especially in the vertical dimension, increased vertical
error caused by environmental factors.
3. Two of the pilots did not perceive the obstacle
on the runway while flying with the HUD. The rest of
the pilots did, but they took longer to respond with
the HUD than without it.
4. Pilots correctly assessed that their flight perfor-
mance with the HUD was more accurate than it was
with the conventional instruments.
The finding that the HUD may have some negative
effect on flight performance is contrary to the find-
ings of previous studies. This may be due to the com-
bination of the runway obstacle a factor not used
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in previousstudies- andhighworkload.It maybe
hypothesizedthat thepilot constructsa cognitive
modelfor the flight task, and that this model is
dynamic and changes with changing needs. The infor-
mation that goes into the model at any moment is
arbitrarily selected by the pilot, based on what he
deems necessary for the current task. Actual flight
performance is then compared with the model on a
continuing basis. At some point in the approach he is
satisfied that the information on the instruments and
from the outside world corresponds with the model
in his head, and he makes the decision to land. The
various information in the model is assigned priori-
ties, probably based on how important it is to the
successful execution of the task, or the probability of
occurrence. As the workload increases, the amount of
information the pilot is able to utilize is reduced;
also, the less important or lower probability items
would be the least likely to be attended to. During
the final phase of the approach this model is likely
narrowed down to the presence of the runway in
proper lateral alignment, correct airspeed (or absence
of speed error), correct aircraft attitude, and altitude.
The above model would explain why two of the
pilots did not see the obstacle on the runway; it was
simply not part of their model, and the low visibility
and the pilots' relative unfamiliarity with the HUD
created a high workload. It would also explain why
pilots did not perceive the vertical offset; it did not
violate their model. They were lined up with the
runway, their altitude was within the acceptable
range, and they felt in control of the aircraft. In fact,
the offset had no practical significance. The ILS
lateral offset, however, did violate the model; the run-
way was not where it was expected - therefore it was
easy to perceive. The lateral boresight offset also
raised a question about the position of the runway, so
it was also recognized, if not understood. Workload
was high in all cases, because of weather conditions
and the fact that the HUD was still relatively new to
the pilots. Individual differences between pilots
would account for some of them responding better
than others under similar circumstances.
It is not known to what extent, if any, the findings
of this exercise apply to the real world. More work is
needed to eliminate the possible simulation and spe-
cific symbology effects on performance with HUD,
and to find out at what point the workload becomes
a critical factor. In the meantime, it is recommended
that users of HUD in commercial aviation train pilots
thoroughly with every capability of the HUD, and
develop crew procedures that would eliminate or
counteract possible negative effects of the HUD.
Ames Research Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Moffett Field, California 94035, June 6, 1980
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APPENDIX
MEAN GLIDE-SLOPE AND LOCALIZER DEVIATION FOR EACH CONDITION
Notes for tables 4-10
Vertical dashed lines indicate breakout point
FG = first gear: designates data at time first gear
touched the runway
NG = nose gear: designates data at time nose gear
touched the runway
Hard landing: denned by I_I> 8 ft sec -1 (first gear
contact)
Short landing: defined by first gear touching ground
in approach lights
Missed approach: an approach in which pilot elected
to go around for any reason
Mean response time and standard deviations are given
in seconds
Mean landing distance from threshold with standard
deviation are given in feet
All deviations and altitude are in feet and are mea-
sured from the 3° glide slope or from runway cen-
terline
Glide-slope deviations: "+" designates above; "-"
designates below
Localizer deviations: "+" designates to the right; "-"
designates to the left of runway centerline
Absolute glide-slope deviation does not reflect direc-
tion of offset
Response time to ILS offset is measured from break-
out to beginning of convergence with the runway
Runway was not necessarily visible at breakout
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TABLE4.-FLIGHTPERFORMANCEWITH90-FTILS OFFSET-ENVIRONMENT
[RVR = 1,600 ft, ceiling = 120 ft, no wind shear]
Altitude, ft
Condition 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 1501100 75 50 25 FG NG
I
Glide-slope deviation, ft
HUD
Mean
SD
No HUD
Mean
SD
-17 -7 -5 -5 -7 --4 -1 0
45 9 8 5 10 7 5 5
29 15 -7 -20 -19 -8 -9 3
31 31 34 33 29 22 23 32
I
I
I
I -2
f 4
I
I
I 6
17 13 13
I
-2 -1 0 ---
5 6 10
4 1 -4 ---
12
Absolute Iocalizer deviation, ft
HUD
Mean
SD
No HUD
Mean
SD
93 90 99 93 71 80 96 86
20 8 24 12 31 21 9 7
126 123 125 ll4 95 91 88 93
90 85 63 68 63 51 52 48
1
I
82 78 63 41 23 18
15 15 12 12 7 12
I
I 88 86 76 63 35 15
I
I 49 43 41 36 20 14
i
Other pertinent flight information
Condition
HUD
No HUD
Response time
to offset (SD),
Sec
3.14 (0.90)
3.00 (1.79)
Number of
missed
approaches
Landing distance
from threshold
(SD), ft
785 (258)
859 (519)
Number of
short
landings
0
0
Number of
hard
landings
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TABLE5.-FLIGHTPERFORMANCEWITH90-FTILSOFFSET-ENVIRONMENT
[RVR=8,000ft,ceiling=380ft, windshear=9]
Condition
Glide-slope deviation, ft
Altitude, ft
800 700 600 500 4001300 200 I50 I00 75 50 25 FG NG
I
HUD
Mean
SD
No HUD
Mean
SC
-6 -2 -1 1 2
11 13 13 9 10
15 9 -1 -8 -6
57 48 40 35 17
I
I
I 2 1 4 -2 -5 -11 -16 ......
t 7 10 11 10 10 8 5
I
I
I 18 18 8 -5 -11 -19 -28 ......
1 16 10 7 9 7 9 10
I
Absolute localizer deviation, ft
HUD
Mean
SD
No HUD
Mean
SC
91 93 91 95 95
9 6 7 4 12
76 80 84 79 107
74 64 52 65 47
i
t 77 57 43 39 32 27 19 12 12
I
t 12 30 35 24 18 i5 12 7 7
I
I 97 54 31 14 9 12 14 15 16
I 50 24 13 10 10 8 8 12 18
1
Other pertinent flight information
Condition
HUD
No HUD
Response time
to offset (SD),
sec
9.14 (7.45)
8.63 (4.47)
Number of
missed
approaches
Landing distance
from threshold
(SD), ft
760 (568)
312 (472)
Number of
short
landings
Number of
hard
landings
22
TABLE6.-FLIGHTPERFORMANCEWITH90-FTILSOFFSET-ENVIRONMENT
[RVR=10,000ft, ceiling=615ft, shear=25]
Condition 800 700
Glide-slope deviation, ft
Altitude, ft
i600 500 400 300 200 150 100 75 50 25 FG NG
I
HUD
Mean
SD
No HUD
Mean
SD
-10 -5
29 16
8 13
21 17
i
I -7 -7 -4 2 0 11 17 16 13 12 ---
1 13 13 13 24 11 19 14 12 I3 18
t
I
t 14 -I -17 -16 -4 -1 7 6 1 -2 ---
I 17 16 19 28 21 22 8 5 7 13
I
Absolute localizer deviation, ft
HUD
Mean
SD
No HUD
Mean
SD
94 94
14 11
71 95
36 81
i
[
96 98 81 75 60 48 42 30 19 16 12 II
6 8 13 27 29 30 18 19 22 17 14 10
I
I
i 134 136 97 62 73 62 28 23 19 15 16 23
I 71 63 60 52 34 42 29 24 18 10 10 15
I
Other pertinent flight information
Condition
HUD
No HUD
Response time
to offset (SD),
sec
43.00 (9.!8)
40.88 (9.48)
Number of
missed
approaches
0
0
Landing distance
from threshold
(SD), ft
ll01 (616)
977 (515)
Number of
short
landings
0
0
Number of
hard
landings
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TABLE 7.-FLIGHT PERFORMANCE WITH LATERAL BORESIGHT OFFSET
IN HUD
Altitude, fl
I 100 75 50 25 FG NGCondition 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 150 I
Environment 1
Glide-slope
deviation
Mean
SD
Localizer
devation
Mean
SD
-18 -6 0 0 -1 2 -1 1
12 10 8 5 2 4 5 5
-2 -8 -9 -12 -2
37 38 21 13 15
4 -6 -3
15 11 11
I
I
1
I
I 1 5 7 7 ....
i 8 8 8 8
I
t
I
I
I -5 -7 -5 -2 -1 0
I 10 8 7 i0 19 17
Environment 2
Glide-slope
deviation
Mean
SD
Localizer
deviation
Mean
SD
-10 -2 -4 -4 -3
14 8 15 17 18
-5 -6 -4 -1 4
14 18 15 12 10
7 -1 6 -3 -8 -13 -18 --
8 17 9 8 12 I6 18
I
I
I
I 8 0 -12 -12 -10 oll -7 -2 1
T 14 20 15 18 17 13 11 8 I1
I
Other pertinent flight information
Condition
E1
E2
Number of
missed approaches
0
0
Landing distance
from threshold (SD), ft
1270 (480)
690 (91 O)
Number of
short landings
0
2
Number of
hard landings
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TABLE8.-FLIGHTPERFORMANCEWITHVERTICALBORESIGHTOFFSET
IN HUD
Condition
Environment1
Altitude,ft
800 700 600 500 400 300 200 1501100 75 50 25 FG NG1
Glide-slope
deviation
Mean
SD
Localizer
deviation
Mean
SD
3 0 -2
5 6 5
2 -2 -2 2
3 4 5 3
8 -1 -2 -2 3 -2 -1
55 29 8 20 9 4 8
1
I
1t 3
31 21
I
1
1 i -1
I
7 i 4
4 3 4 .....
4 5 10
-2 -3 -3 -2 5
7 10 13 12 18
Environment 2
Glide-slop(
deviation
Mean
SD
Localizer
deviation
Mean
SD
1 -2 -4
10 9 12
3 -I1 -19 0
14 20 45 12
I
I
t
1 2 I-2
I
6 5 '1 8
I
I
I
I
2 I -6
8117
I
-6 -11 -17 -21 -22 -27 ---
11 10 16 16 18 17
1 -4 -9 -9 -11 -11 0 5
1I 13 17 13 13 14 11 8
Environment 3
Glide-slop(
deviation
Mean
SD
Localizer
deviation
Mean
SD
-3 5
13 14
-3 2
21 11
1
I
I
I 3 -2 -1
I 7 5
I
I
I
I
I 2 7
I 6 6
I
-1 3 8 II 18 12 8 ---
1i 11 25 10 14 19 18 22
5 -1 -2 -8 -3 2 5 7 9 1
17 11 21 21 I6 18 16 I4 15 16
Other pertinent flight information
Condition
E1
E2
E3
Number of
missed approaches
Landing distance
from threshold (SD), ft
1263 (685)
529 (377)
1025 (487)
Number of
short landings
Number of
hard landings
1
2
2
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TABLE9.-FLIGHTPERFORMANCEWITHHUD,NOOFFSET
Altitude,ft
I 100 75 50 25 FG NGCondition800 700 600 500 400 300 200 150I
Environment1
Glide-slope
deviation
Mean
SD
Localizer
deviation
Mean
SD
-2 -3 1 -3 -5 -2 -5 1
9 5 5 7 6 3 7 11
3 2 3 8
9 12 8 8
1 5 5 5
5 9 16 20
1
I
I
I -7 -6 -6 -5 ......
IE 9 9 8 9
I
L
1 1 -2 -2 -1 2 -I
I 8 8 8 7 11 11
I
Environment 2
Glide -slope
deviation
Mean
SD
Localizer
deviation
Mean
SD
-1 -2 -2 1 0
6 10 12 7 8
0 -6 5 2 1
12 16 16 17 13
I
t
I
I 4 -1 -2 -10 -11 -14 -11 .....
I 5 7 6 9 13 18 10
I
I
I
I
I 4 -5 -9 -11 -7 -7 -3 4 -1
t17 9 16 26 28 22 16 14 19
Environment 3
Glide-slope
deviation
Mean
SD
Localizer
deviation
Mean
SD
-4 -4
1 16
-1 -2
18 20
i
I
1
I -5 -3 6
i 12 8 9
I
I
t
P -4 0 -3
14 9 7
4 -1 8 6 4 0 -3 ......
7 6 12 7 7 10 13
-3 7 -6 -12 -12 -12 -11 -10 -9
13 10 12 11 9 10 10 9 10
Other pertinent flight information
Condition
E1
E2
E3
Number of
missed approaches
Landing distance
from threshold (SD), ft
855 (231)
1107 (551)
737 (402)
Number of
short landings
0
0
0
Number of
hard landings
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TABLE10.-FLIGHTPERFORMANCEWITHNOHUD,NOOFFSET
Altitude,ft
Condition 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 1501 100 75 50 25 FG NG
I
Environment 1
Glide-slope
deviation
Mean
SD
Localizer
deviation
Mean
SD
56 36 12 5 10 2 0 -4
81 65 53 40 45 45 38 36
49 30 20 19 32 44 18 3
106 89 71 107 129 100 44 55
I
1
I
I 14 7 5 0 ......
t 28 24 24 23
I
I
I
I 3 5 5 2 1 15
58 53 44 30 16 13
Environment 2
Glide -slope
deviation
Mean
SD
Localizer
deviation
Mean
SD
-5 -25 -17 -3 13
26 43 34 38 26
69 52 15 27 34
103 98 89 106 70
I
I
21 12 8 -5 -13 -22 -30 ......
23 13 10 9 10 10 10
I
I
I
I 20 19 18 14 11 9 7 6 4
I 34 46 34 22 15 9 8 11 12
I
Environment 3
Glide-slope
deviation
Mean
SD
Localizer
deviation
Mean
SD
17 16
18 53
84 -12
218 90
I
I
I
-10 -13 -23 -19 -4 17 19 14 7 2 ......
65 22 43 37 41 14 11 10 9 10
I
I
I
1-26 8 16 36 6 -5 -10 -11 -10 -8 -4 1
Illi 161 71 92 38 31 20 14 12 13 10 7
Other pertinent flight information
Condition
E1
E2
E3
Number of
missed approaches
Landing distance
from threshold (SD), ft
979(872)
106(226)
1216(701)
Number of
short landings
Number of
hard landings
2
3
0
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